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ABSTRACT 
This research paper deals with the preferential creditor regime in a 
company' s insolvency. The paper first gives an overview of different preferential 
creditor regimes and the changes which have taken place in New Zealand. It 
explains that the basic principle in insolvency law provides for the equal 
distribution of the assets among all unsecured creditors. Granting preferential 
entitlements to specific creditors is contrary to this principle. However, there are 
specific creditors who need additional protection for social, economic or political 
reasons. 
The paper then examines the legal and technical issues of the current 
preferential creditor system after the introduction of the Personal Property 
Securities Act 1999. It points out its deficiencies, in particular the inconsistency 
between the preferential creditor regime and the Personal Property Securities Act. 
It is important that the statutory principles for distributing the assets are 
transparent, as clearly any preference will be at the expense of others. 
The paper next reconsiders the preferential positions of employees and the 
Crown, the two largest classes of preferential creditors. While the preferential 
status of the Crown is predominantly supposed, there is consensus that employees 
need protection. However, the method and the extent of protection are arguable. 
The paper finally discusses whether or not there are alternatives to the 
existing preferential creditor system. In particular, it will be discussed whether the 
best approach to solve the problems is to completely abolish the preferential 
entitlements of employees and the Crown. The complete abolition might kill two 
birds with one stone. Both the deficiencies caused by the enactment of the PPSA 
and the remaining difficulties to balance the employees ' interests could be solved. 
This research paper comprises 14,883 words exluding front page, table of 
contents, abstract, footnotes and bibliography. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
The subject of priority creditors is controversial and vanes across the 
jurisdictions. The decision as to which creditors are at the front of the queue in a 
debtor' s insolvency is the determining factor if a creditor will get paid or miss out. 
Since the problem of insolvency has been increasing in almost all parts of the 
globe, the issue has been gaining global recognition. There are three broad groups 
of preferential creditor regimes into which countries fall. The first group follows a 
more traditional approach retaining wide preferential rights for certain creditors, 
examples of which are France, Spain, Ireland, Italy and South Africa. The next 
group has reduced the level of priority significantly, for example Australia, the 
United Kingdom and Canada. Finally, the last group including Germany and 
Austria has completely abolished preferential claims. 1 
The position of New Zealand will be discussed in this research paper. 
Changes have been made to New Zealand's preferential creditor system by the 
introduction of the Personal Property Securities Act 1999 (PPSA) and the 
Companies Amendment Acts 2004 and 2006. In 2002, the coming into effect of 
the PPSA led to corresponding amendments of the preferential creditor regime.2 
The particular structure adopted for New Zealand 's preferential creditor system 
was anomalous and in particular created the potential for circular priorities. This 
led to further amendments but some inconsistencies still exist. While the PPSA 
adaptations govern the priority order between preferential creditors and secured 
creditors, the Companies Amendment Acts 2004 and 2006 concern the priority 
order among the different classes of preferential creditors. The amendments 
particularly changed the preferential claims of employees and enhanced their 
entitlements in the scope of application and in amount.3 
A tension exists between the need to protect employees or other 
preferential creditors on the insolvency of the employer and the need to ensure 
that the protection or level of protection given does not cause undue detriment to 
1 Andrew Keay, Andre Boraine, David Burdette "Preferential Debts in Corporate Insolvency: a 
Comparative Study'' (2001) 10 Int. Insolv. Rev 167, 168. 
2 Personal Property Securities Amendment Act 2001 , Receiverships Amendment Act 2001. 
3 Companies Amendment Act 2004 and Companies Amendment Act 2006. 
6 
other creditors or cause harm to the overall economy. 4 Therefore, preferential 
entitlements must be balanced against the rights of unsecured creditors in 
insolvency. 
4 Paul Heath "Preferential Payments on Bankruptcy and Liquidation in New Zealand: Are they 
Justifiable Exceptions to the Pari Passu Rule" (1996) 4 Waikato Law Review 25, 44. 
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II PREFERENTIAL STATUS 
A Pari Passu Rule and Preferential Creditors 
The pari passu rule of distribution is a fundamental principle of insolvency 
law. 5 In the case of a debtor ' s insolvency the pari passu rule states that the assets 
will be divided among the creditors in proportion to the amount of each creditor's 
claim. 6 All unsecured creditors are to be treated equally. This principle of equal 
sharing is expressed in section 313(2) of the Companies Act 1993 (the Act). As a 
debtor' s insolvency requires that the debtor's liabilities exceed its assets, some of 
the creditors will not be completely satisfied. 7 The rationale underlying the pari 
passu rule is that no creditors should receive preference over the general body of 
creditors in the division of assets. The principle ' first in first served' gives way to 
that of the orderly realisation of assets. 8 
However, this objective of equal distribution is virtually impossible in 
practice. In the overwhelming majority of cases, it is substantially undermined by 
the existence of preferential debts. 9 Preferential creditors are unsecured creditors 
who are given a special priority to payment by statute. 10 Section 312(1) of the Act 
and section 30(2) of the Receiverships Act 1993 (Receiverships Act) require 
liquidators and receivers to pay out these unsecured creditors before other 
unsecured creditors. Also the rights of certain, but not all secured creditors may be 
subordinated to the debt of preferential creditors. 11 The group of preferential 
creditors represent a major exception to the pari passu rule, as the range of 
creditors upon whom statutory priority is conferred is extensive. 12 
5 Attorney General v McMillan & Lockwood Ltd [1991] 1 NZLR 53 , 58 (CA). 
6 Ibid . 
7 Michael Gedye "The Structure of New Zealand ' s "New" Priority Debts Regime" (2003) 9 
NZBLQ 220, 221 . 
8 Royston Miles Goode Principles of Co,porate Insolvency Law (3 ed, Sweet & Maxwell , London, 
2005) 60. 
9 Australian Law Reform Commission (Chainnan, Mr. Ronald Hanner) General Insolvency 
Inqui,y (Harmer Report) Report No.45 1988, para 33 . 
10Brookers Insolvency Law & Practice, Commentary on Companies Act (vol 2, Loose leaf, 
Brookers, Wellington, 2007) CA 312.0 I. 
11 Trish Keeper Pref erential Creditors in Rt Hon Justice Blanchard Business Insoh•ency (New 
Zealand Law Society, Wellington , 2007) 107, see below Chapter III A 3 (b) . 
12 Australian Law Reform Commission, above n 9, para 33. 
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B Preferential Claims 
Schedule 7 to the Act ranks claims within the class of preferential 
creditors, with each sub-class having priority over the subsequent sub-class. 
Schedule 7 to the Act sets out five basic classes of preferential debt; 
administration costs; employee related claims; miscellaneous debts; and Crown 
related debts. In cases of receiverships, section 30(2) of the Receiverships Act 
refers to Schedule 7 of the Act, but states that the reimbursement for expenses and 
remuneration of the receiver ranks ahead of all the preferential claims and 
replaces the administration costs of Schedule 7, clause 1(1) of the Act. 
The first class in a liquidation, being the costs associated with the initiation 
and administration of the liquidation, is payable in the order of priority in which 
they are listed. 13 It includes the payment of the liquidator's costs and expenses 
incurred in administering the liquidation as well as the costs of the person who 
applied to liquidate the company. The Companies Amendment Act 2006 
introduced two new categories of preferential claim within this class: the inclusion 
of voluntary administration costs, 14 and costs of creditors who protect or preserve 
the value of assets of the company. 15 Administration costs are not typical 
unsecured preferential debts, as these costs would not have occurred without the 
insolvency. Both the public and the creditors are interested in professional and 
competent administration to maximise the fund for distribution. Without 
preferential status it would be difficult to encourage qualified people to fulfil this 
task. 16 
As second priority, the liquidator is required to pay employee related 
claims for unpaid wages and salary, as well as for amounts of holiday pay and 
unpaid redundancy payments. Included also are payments for certain amounts 
deducted by the company from the wages of an employee to satisfy obligations of 
the employee toward the Crown.17 
13 Schedule 7, cl I ( I )(a) of the Companies Act (the Act) . 
14 Schedule 7, cl l(l)(b) of the Act. 
15 Schedule 7, cl l(l)(e)(ii) of the Act, introduced to provide an incentive for creditors to assist the 
company to recover or preserve its assets. 
16 Heath, above n 4, 39. 
17 See below Chapter TV C I. 
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After payment of these classes, a liquidator is next charged to pay certain 
debts of layby sales under the Layby Sales Act 1971 and the costs of organising a 
meeting to vote on a compromise. 18 
Finally, at the lowest priority class rank the payment of certain outstanding 
taxes and duties owed to the Crown. The Crown debts are GST, PAYE, RWT, 
R WT and Customs duty. 19 
Preferential treatment is also given to subrogated rights. Where any person 
provides funds for the payment of preferential entitlements, the funder is 
subrogated and replaces the preferential creditor to the extent of the latter' s 
preferential debt.20 
C Reasons for Exceptions 
The amount which the preferential creditors are owed can often be so large 
that there is little, or nothing, left for general secured and unsecured creditors? In 
each case it is therefore necessary to ask whether the exception to the pari passu 
rule is justified.22 The granting of preferential status to the debt has to be 
consistent with efficient insolvency administration.23 Preferential treatment has 
been justified by social, economic, and political reasons including the principles 
of fairness and equity, which promote and protect the public interest.
24 By far the 
largest category of preferential debts belongs to the wages and entitlements of 
employees and to Crown debts.25 
There is a general consensus that employees require additional protection. 
Their preferential status can be justified for many reasons.
26 Employees are 
18 Schedule 7, cl I (3) and ( 4) of the Act. 
19 Schedule 7, cl 1(5) of the Act. 
20 Schedule?, cl 4 of the Act. ll1e Companies Amendment Act 2006 extended preferential 
treatment to any part of funds advanced by a third party, while formerl y preferential treatment was 
only given where the funds were provided for payment of employees ' preferential claims. 
2 1 Keay, Boraine and Burdette, above n I , 167. 
22 Heath , above n 4, 31. 
23 Australian Law Reform Commission, above n 9, para 33. 
24 Insolvency Law Review Committee (UK, Chaim1an Sir Kenneth Cork) Insolvency Lmt' and 
Practice (Cork Report) 1982, 1398. 
25 Gedye, above n 7, 222. 
26 New Zealand Law Commission (Law Commission) Priority Debts in rhe Distribution of 
Insolvent Estates: An Advismy Report to the Minis fly of Commerce, Study Paper 2, Wellington, 
1999, paras 43-45. 
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usually dependent upon wages. Generally, there will be one employer and one 
source of income for any one employee. Employees are less able and not expected 
to evaluate the financial position of an employer and are often unable to take 
meaningful steps to protect themselves from their employer's insolvency.
27 
Additionally, New Zealand is a member of the International Labour Organisation 
and should therefore comply with the Convention on the Protection of Worker ' s 
Claims (Employer Insolvency) 1992. This convention requires that workers' 
claims be protected either by grant of privilege on insolvency or by a guaranteed 
institution such as a wage earner protection fund. 28 However, the concrete amount 
and method of protection is questionable.29 
Though the justification of Crown preferential debt is controversial, 
preferential treatment continued in New Zealand. 30 The government and legislator 
justified the preferential status for several reasons. The most common one is that 
taxes are owed to the community rather than to the individual. Unlike the claims 
of private commercial creditors, tax claims are for the benefit of all. 
3 1 The 
Crown' s revenue must be protected.32 Another argument is that the Inland 
Revenue Department (IRD) is an involuntary creditor. Additionally, most of the 
tax claims are indirect debts of a quasi-trust nature. 33 
21 Re Lawsan Electric Co Inc 300 F 736 (SONY) 1923 . 
28 Law Commission, above n 26, para 45. New Zealand 1s not obliged to comply, as the 
Convention has not yet been ratified in New Zealand. 
29 ee below Chapter IV B 2 and 3 and Chapter V C. 
30 There are a nwnber of opposing arguments on this issue, see below Chapter IV C 2. 
3 1 Hon Laila Harre ', previous Minister of Commerce "Tier One Decisions and Where to From 
Here" Speech to the Business Law Forum on Insolvency Reform , Auckland, 22 November 200 I 
http://www.med.govt.nz (accessed 30 September 2008) . 
32 Ibid. 
33 See Law Commission, above n 26, para 132, 146. 
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III POST PPSA PREFERENTIAL CREDITOR SYSTEM 
A Changes through the Enactment of the PPSA 
I Interaction between preferential creditor regime and PPSA 
Preferential claims have priority over certain, but not all secured 
creditors. 34 The PPSA defines the different forms and creation of security 
interests; details priority levels among secured creditors; and regulates to a large 
extent the enforcement of security interests over personal property. 35 It applies 
where personal property is used as collateral. The enactment of the PPSA 1999 
changed the law relating to security interests significantly. As the previous 
preferential creditor regime had referred to the terminology of the old PPSA, 
corresponding amendments to the preferential creditor regime had to be made 
before the coming into force of the PPSA on 1 May 2002. 36 The new Schedule 7 
of the Act refers to the security interests defined and created by the PPSA. 
2 Policy of the PPSA 
The PPSA is a wholly statutory system that for most purposes replaced the 
common law security interest (registration) system, namely the Chattels Transfer 
Act 1924, the Companies (Registration of Charges) Act 1993, the Motor Vehicle 
Securities Act 1989, and the Industrial and Provident Societies Amendment Act 
1952. The PPSA prescribes the mechanism for the creation and prioritisation of 
charges, and establishes a uniform registration system for security interests in 
personal property. 
One of the PPSA's objectives was to abolish formalistic distinctions and to 
equally treat transactions that in substance utilise personal prope11y as collateral 
for the performance of an obligation. 37 The PPSA looks at the substance of a 
transaction and not at its form. 38 The PPSA priority rules apply to security 
interests over fixed or circulating, present or future assets. In contrast, under prior 
34 Schedule 7, cl 2( I )(b) of the Act. 
35 Peter Eady PPSA : Putting the Act into Practice (New Zealand Law Society, Wellington, 2002) 
40. 
36 Personal Property Securities Amendment Act 200 I, Receiverships Amendment Act 200 I. 
37 S 17(1)ofthePPSA. 
38 Eady, above n 35, 40. 
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law circulating assets were subject only to a floating charge not to a fixed charge. 
Whatever from a security interest now takes, it is regulated by the same set of 
statutory rules. 39 
A consequence of the new pnonty rules is the quasi-abolition of the 
traditional floating charge. 40 The PPSA does not abolish the floating charge, it 
merely makes the prior law's distinction between fixed and floating charge 
irrelevant. A security interest attaches to collateral when the statutory 
requirements are met without depending on its form. 41 
3 New concept of the post PPSA preferential creditor regime 
Section 312, Schedule 7 of the Act and section 30 of the Receiverships Act 
were amended,42 to accommodate the new type of security arrangement and its 
terminology. The intention of the amendments was to preserve existing priorities 
in particular the subordination of certain secured creditors to preferential 
creditors.43 
(a) Previous preferential creditor system 
The prior preferential creditors system broadly provided that preferential 
creditors had priority over debts secured by a floating charge, but rank below 
debts secured by a fixed charge or by retention of title. 44 A charge is an interest in 
property created in favour of a creditor to secure the amount owing. The title is 
not transferred to the creditor, but it gives the chargee the right to have the 
charged assets realised in order to pay off the debt. A charge can either be fixed or 
floating. 
39 Gedye, above n 7, 225. 
40 Sees 17(1) and (3) of the PPSA 1999, David Brown and Thomas G. W. Telfer Personal and 
COJporate Insolvency Legislation: Guide and Commenta1y to the 2006 Amendments (LexisNexis 
NZ, Wellington, 2007) 97. 
4 1 S 40(1) of the PPSA. 
42 Personal Property Securities Amendment Act 200 I, Receiverships Amendment Act 200 l . 
43 Brown and Telfer, above n 40, 97 . 
44 Schedule 7, para 9(b) of the Companies Act 1993, as applied until 2002. 
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(b) Current preferential creditor regime 
As the form of the security interest is irrelevant under the PPSA,
45 the 
amendments to the preferential creditor regime were based largely on the assets 
taken as collateral rather than on the form of security interest. Schedule 7, clause 
2(l)(b) of the Act and section 30(1) and (2) of the Receiverships Act now broadly 
provide that preferential creditors have priority over secured creditors with a 
security interest in the company's accounts receivable and inventory. This does 
not apply to secured creditors with a purchase money security interest (PMSI) or 
assignees of accounts receivable for which new value is provided,
46 such as 
occurs in factoring. 
( c) Priority of preferential creditors over creditors with security interests over 
the company' s accounts receivable or inventory 
The concepts of security interests over accounts receivable and inventory 
are used to describe assets that would have been made the subject of a floating 
charge. A floating charge co, crs all or parts of the debtor's assets. It allows the 
debtor to use the charged assets freely until the event of insolvency. It was used in 
cases of circulating assets or assets with fluctuating value, like stocks and book 
debts. In place of these assets the preferential creditor system now uses the asset 
types of inventory and accounts receivable. 
47 The priority of preferential creditors 
over assets which were formerly subject to a floating charge is therefore 
preserved. 
(d) Exceptions for PMSI holders and assignees of accounts receivable for 
which new value is provided48 
The reason for the exceptions in Schedule 7, clause 2( I )(b) of the Act and 
section 30(1) of the Receiverships Act is that PMSis in the terminology of the 
new PPSA include retention of title clauses and other interests were in substance 
security is being taken in order to facilitate purchase of the assets. Prior to the 
PPSA these interests would have been fixed proprietary or possessory security 
45 See above Chapter III A 2. 
46 Schedule 7, cl 2(l)(b)(i)(B)and(C) of the Act, s 30(l)(b)and(c) of the Receiverships Act. 
47 Gedye, above n 7, 227 . 
48 Schedule 7, cl 2(l)(b)(i)(B)and(C) of the Act, s 30(l)(b)and(c) of the Receiverships Act. 
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interests which were enforced prior to all other classes of creditors.-. LJ The new 
exceptions therefore operate to preserve the position ofretention of title and other 
fixed security interests. 50 
(e) Section 312(2) of the Act 
Section 312(2) of the Act states that, assets which are subject to charges 
are not used to satisfy preferential creditors. However, by referring to Schedule 7 
clause 2(1 )(b) of the Act, section 312(2) of the Act stipulates that certain secured 
creditor interests are subordinate to preferential debts to the extent that there are 
insufficient other assets to meet all preferential claims. These are the holders of 
security interests over all or part of the company's accounts receivable or 
inventory , the formerly floating charge holders. 51 
4 Entitlements under the Companies Act and Receiverships Act 
(a) Statutory duty 
The priority given to preferential creditors is conferred indirectly by 
imposing an obligation on receivers and liquidators to distribute the debtor's 
assets in accordance with the statutory preferential creditor provisions. In cases of 
liquidation, section 312 of the Act requires a liquidator to apply the company's 
assets in accordance with Schedule 7 of the Act. For receiverships, section 30(2) 
of the Receiverships Act requires the receiver to comply with the provisions of 
Schedule 7 of the Act, as though the liquidation references in the schedule were 
references to receivership. Paying preferential creditors as set out in the 
Companies and Receiverships Act is a statutory duty. Receivers and liquidators 
are liable in damages in tort to preferential claimants for breaches of this duty. 52 
The preferential creditor has usually no direct proprietary rights against a 
third party, if it received assets that should have been distributed to the 
49 Brown and Telfer, above n 40, 98. 
50 Brookers Insolvency Law & Practice Commentary on Receiverships Act (vol 2, loose leaf, 
Brookers, Wellington, 2007) RA30 .02 . 
51Brookers, above n 10, CA 312.02. 
52 Section 312( 1) of the Companies Act, Section 30(1) and (2) of the Receiverships Act, Peter 
Blanchard and Michael Gedye The Law of Private Receivers of Companies in New Zealand 
(LexisNexis, Wellington, 2008) 184. 
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preferential creditor. However in cases, where the recipient of misdirected assets 
has colluded in the breach, the preferential creditor can directly claim against the 
recipient. 53 A further exemption exists in section 184 of the Property Law Act 
2007 (PPA). 
(b) Avoidance of preferential claims 
The appointment of receivers or liquidators triggers preferential creditor 
entitlements, while direct enforcement against personal property by a secured 
party under Part 9 of the PPSA usually does not. That means, if a direct sale can 
be affected without the use of a receivership or liquidation, the creditor does not 
have to concede priority to preferential creditors. 
54 An exemption exists with 
regard to the taking of possession by a mortgagee under the Property Law Act. 
55 
(c) Receivership and liquidation 
Section 30 of the Receiverships Act applies to every company which goes 
into receivership and which is not at the date of commencement of receivership 
already in liquidation. The fact that a company which is in receivership later goes 
into liquidation does not render the section inapplicable; nor does the existence of 
an application at the time of commencement of receivership. 
56 
53 Gedye, above n 7, 223 . 
54 Blanchard and Gedye, above n 52, 188. 
55 Ss 185(5), 153 of the PPA. 
56 Blanchard and Gedye, above n 52, 168. 
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B Deficiencies 
I Difficulties with definitions 
According to Schedule 7, clause 2(1)(b)(i) of the Act and section 30(1) and 
(2) of the Receiverships Act, liquidators and receivers must apply accounts 
receivable and inventory but no other asset types to pay preferential creditors. 
(a) Accounts receivable
57 
Part 2, section 16(1) of the PPSA defines accounts receivable as a 
monetary obligation that is not evidenced by chattel paper, an investment security, 
or by a negotiable instrument, whether or not that obligation has been earned by 
performance. 58 
As only accounts receivable and inventory, but no other asset types are 
applied to pay preferential creditors, the breath of accounts receivable on the one 
hand and the breadth of chattel paper, investment security or negotiable 
instrument on the other hand is the decisive factor for who will get paid. 
( i) Chattel paper 
It can be difficult to distinguish between accounts receivable and chattel 
paper. A chattel paper means one or more writings that evidence both a monetary 
obligation and a security interest in, or lease of, specific goods or specific goods 
and accessions. 59 Therefore, when a security interest in specific goods has been 
created in writing a chattel paper and not an evidence of accounts receivable is 
constituted. Problems can arise with regard to the tenn "specific goods". For 
example, a security agreement can include goods that are to come from the 
seller's warehouse which cannot be identified at the time of sale. 
60 The 
determination could depend on whether the actual goods were identified by the 
time the document was issued. 
57 Schedule 7, cl 2(l)(b)(i)(A) of the Act, section 30(l)(a) of the Receiverships Act. 
58 Emphasis added. 
59 S 16(l)ofthePPSA. 
60 Blanchard and Gedye, above n 52, 172. 
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(ii) Investment security 
An investment security includes a writing that is recognised in the place in 
which it is issued as evidencing an obligation of the issuer and that, in the 
ordinary course of business, is transferred or withdrawn by an entry in the records 
maintained for that purpose by or on behalf of the nominee. 61 For example, shares 
are investment securities. With regard to investment securities, uncertainty exists 
whether a credit balance in a bank account should be classified as an account 
receivable or as an investment security. A bank credit would usually fulfil these 
criteria, too. However, if the bank account is a simple form of monetary obligation 
without investment elements, like without interest, it seems more naturally be 
regarded as an account receivable. The distinction could be drawn whether the 
evidence paper is a simple deposit record or whether the document requires to be 
surrendered in order for the customer to be paid. 62 
( iii) Negotiable instrument 
A negotiable instrument includes a writing that evidences a right to payment of 
money that is transferred by delivery with any necessary endorsement or 
assignment and a letter of credit which must be presented on claiming payment.63 
Excluded are chattel paper, a document of title, or an investment security. Due to 
these exclusions there is no overlap between negotiable instrument and chattel 
paper or investment security. While there are overlaps between the latter two and 
accounts receivable, the definition of negotiable instrument does not lead to 
specific problems in the context of preferential claims. 64 
(b) Inventory65 
The key factor for the determination whether goods are inventory is the 
purpose for which the goods are held at the time when the security interest in the 
goods attaches. 66 According to Part 2 section 16(1) of the PPSA inventory means 
6 1 Sees 16(1) of the PPSA. 
62 Blanchard and Gedye, above n 52, 174. 
63 See s 16( I) of the PPSA. 
64 Michael Gedye "Anomalies and Lacunae in the Treatment of Preferential Creditors" (2003) 9 
NZBLQ 295, 296. 
65 Schedule 7, cl 2( 1 )(b)(i)(A) of the Act, section 30(1 )(a) of the Receiverships Act. 
66 S 16(3) of the PPSA. 
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goods that are held by a person for sale or lease, or that have been leased by that 
person as lessor; goods that are to be provided or have been provided under a 
contract for services; raw materials or work in progress; or materials used or 
consumed in a business. Therefore, if the company's purpose is to sell, lease, or 
consume the goods, the goods are part of the company's inventory. 67 
(c) PMSI68 
There are four types of PMSis. 69 Namely, security interests taken in 
collateral by the seller to secure the obligation to pay the collateral's purchase 
price, so-called vendor finance; security interests taken in collateral by a person 
who has given value to enable the debtor to acquire rights in the collateral, a kind 
of acquisition finance ; the interest of a lessor of goods under a lease of more than 
one year; and the interest of a consignor who delivers goods to a consignee under 
a commercial consignment. In the case of acquisition finance, it can be difficult to 
decide whether or not the payment given by the debtor was applied for the 
acquisition of rights in the collateral. The qualification as PMSI can be 
complicated with regard to all-assets-securities with present and after-acquired 
assets. Schedule 7 clause 2(l)(b) of the Act and section 30(1) of the Receiverships 
Act provide that preferential creditors are given priority, if the security interest "is 
not" a PMS!. The wording "is not" indicates that it is necessary that the purchase 
money security interest does not only exist at the commencement of the 
liquidation or receivership, 70 but does still exists at the time when the receiver 
applies the proceeds of the inventory. 71 
Schedule 7, clause 2 (l)(b)(i) of the Act stipulates that preferential claims 
have priority "to the extent" that the security interest is not a PMSI. However, 
section 30 of the Receiverships Act seems only to give priority to preferential 
creditors where the security agreement does not create a PMS! at all. Priority 
appears not to be given where a security interest agreement creates a PMSI in 
some collateral and a non-PMS I in other collateral. 72 That means preferential 
67 Blanchard and Gedye, above n 52, 174. 
68 Schedule 7, clause 2( I )(b)(i)(B) of the Act, section 30( I )(b) of the Receiverships Act. 
69 Part 2, s 16( I) of the PPSA. 
70 Blanchard and Gedye, above n 52, 174 . 
71 Gedye, above n 64, 301 . 
72 Ibid. 
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creditors have only priority where none of the assets under the security agreement 
is subject of a PMSI. Security agreements that comprise PMSis as well as non-
PMSis are not uncommon. It can arise in many all-assets-securities. For example, 
arrangements where a supplier takes security over supplied goods as well as over 
other goods not financed by the supplier. Or where a security interest in goods 
supplied is not discharged when the goods are paid for. 73 
2 Proceeds 
(a) Proceeds of a PMSI 
Regarding the extent of a PMSI, the issue arises as to whether the priority 
given to PMSI holders includes the proceeds of the inventory which was the 
subject of the PMSI. This issue arises if the inventory that was subject to the 
PMSI is sold by the company before the commencement of the receivership or 
liquidation. The inventory can thereby have been converted into accounts 
receivable. 
Schedule 7, clause 2(1)(b)(i) of the Act and section 30(1) of the 
Receiverships Act which regulate the priority of PMSI holders over preferential 
creditors do not mention proceeds. However, Schedule 7, clause 2(l)(b)(ii) and 
section 30(2) of the Receiverships Act mention proceeds of accounts receivable or 
inventory, which means that the entitlements of the preferential creditors include 
these proceeds. Under the PPSA a security interest that is dealt with or otherwise 
gives rise to proceeds automatically extends to these proceeds. 74 The PPSA 
priority rules accord the same priority to the PMSI holder's claim to the proceeds 
as to the claim to the inventory before it was sold by the company. 75 The priority 
of PMSI holders over inventory would include accounts receivable when the 
accounts receivable sprang from the sale of the inventory. 76 However, the 
definition of PMSI in section 16 of the PPSA does not include the proceeds of the 
original collateral in which a purchase money security was held. According to 
Schedule 7, clause 2(2) of the Act, a PMSI under the preferential creditor system 
has the same meaning as under the PPSA. It seems unlikely that the drafter 
73 Ibid . 
74 S 45(l)(b) of the PPSA. 
75 Blanchard and Gedye, above n 52, 174. 
76 Brookers, above n 50, RA30.02 . 
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intended to deny a PMSI holder a priority over preferential creditors where the 
inventory covered by the PMSI had been sold before the commencement of the 
receivership. On the other hand, this result could follow from the different terms 
of section 30(1) and (2) of the Receiverships Act and Schedule 7, clause 2(l)(b)(i) 
and (ii) of the Act. 77 
(b) Proceeds of inventory and accounts receivable 
According to Schedule 7, clause 2(1)(b)(ii) of the Act and section 30(2) of 
the Receiverships Act liquidators and receivers must apply any accounts 
receivable and inventory that are subject to the security interest or their proceeds. 
This raises the question whether proceeds are restricted to proceeds of realisations 
during the receivership not extending to proceeds held before the commencement 
of the receivership. 78 If proceeds extend to proceeds held before the 
commencement of the receivership, receivers will be obliged to undertake 
extremely difficult tracing exercises to determine which assets on hand are 
proceeds of inventory or accounts receivable. Therefore, it is argued that 
"proceeds" in Schedule 7, clause 2(1)(b)(ii) of the Act and section 30(2) of the 
Receiverships Act only include post-receivership realisations. 79 This would 
eliminate the tracing analysis that liquidators or receivers would otherwise face. 
However, this interpretation would differ from the PPSA. Under the PPSA 
proceeds are applied in the same way as the inventory. 80 Additionally, if the time 
of commencement of liquidation or receivership is the decisive moment whether 
the assets are subject to preferential creditor claims, the available assets could be 
affected by pre-receivership or pre-liquidation realisations. Secured creditors 
might try to realise inventory and accounts receivable to convert such assets into 
collateral that is not inventory or accounts receivable. 81 
77 Blanchard and Gedye, above n 52, 174. 
78 See Brookers, above n 50, RA30.02. 
79 Gedye, above n 64, 305. 
80 See 45(1)(b) of the PPSA. 
8 1 Gedye, above n 64, 305. 
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3 Overlap of receivership and liquidation 
According to Schedule 7, clause 2(1)(b) of the Act and section 30(1) of the 
Receiverships Act, preferential creditors have priority over certain, but not all 
secured creditors. Section 30 of the Receiverships Act applies to every company 
which goes into receivership and which is not at the date of commencement of the 
receivership already in liquidation. 82 If the company has already, before the 
commencement of the receivership, been put into liquidation, section 30 of the 
Receiverships Act has no application. A receiver will have no obligation to apply 
inventory and accounts receivable in payment of preferential creditors. The 
liquidator who has the obligation to pay those creditors under section 312(1) and 
Schedule 7, clause 2(1)(b) of the Act may have no access to the assets. There is no 
explicit obligation on the receiver to release assets to the liquidator to enable him 
to meet his obligation. However, it is very unlikely that this result is intended. 
83 In 
contrast, the former section 308 of the Companies Act 1955 said that specific 
debts must be paid in priority in a winding up, without limiting to the liquidator 
alone the obligation of making payment. Schedule 7 clause 2(1)(b) of the Act and 
section 30(2) of the Receiverships Act make it clear that preferential creditors 
should be given priority. The receiver may be required either to pay preferential 
creditors on behalf of the liquidator from accounts receivable and inventory in 
priority to the secured creditor or to release to the liquidator sufficient of those 
assets to enable the liquidator to make the payment. 
84 
4 Specific Receiverships Act issue 
An issue arisen due to the differences between receivership and liquidation 
has now been fixed. According to Schedule 7, clause 1 (2)(a) of the Act 
preferential status is given to unpaid wages or salary of any employee in respect 
of the four months before the commencement of the liquidation. Unlike 
liquidation, receivership or rather the appointment of a receiver does not 
automatically terminate employments contracts. The receiver has 14 days from 
the date of appointment to decide whether or not to terminate employment 
contracts. Therefore, the preferential status of any payment due to an employee 
82 Blanchard and Gedye, above n 52, 168. 
83 Gedye, above n 64, 304. 
84 Blanchard and Gedye, above n 52, 168. 
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for wages earned or holiday pay or redundancy accrued during this 14 day period 
was unclear. 85 Accordingly, new subsections 3 0(3 )( d) and ( e) were introduced 
into the Receiverships Act 1993. The preferential entitlement includes unpaid 
wages, holiday pay and redundancy payments accrued in the 14 days period or 
any extended period authorised under the Receiverships Act. A consequence of 
these changes is that payments of wages or salary in this interval will now count 
towards the total sum per employee for which preferential priority is given. 86 
5 Inconsistencies between the priority rules of the PPSA and the preferential 
creditor system 
(a) Preferential creditor system before the Companies Amendment Act 2006 
Schedule 7, clause 2(1)(b)(i)(B) and (C) of the Act conceded priority to 
PMSI holders and security interest holders arising from the transfer of accounts 
receivable for new value. However, the priority provisions of the preferential 
creditor regime of Schedule 7 of the Act were partly inconsistent with the priority 
provisions of the PPSA. 87 Under Schedule 7, clause 2(l)(b)(i)(B) and (C) of the 
Act all holders of a PMSI or assignees of accounts receivable for new value had 
priority over preferential creditors without depending on whether the security 
interest has been perfected. 
Identical problems existed under the Receiverships Act. There was a 
conflict between the receiver's duty to pay preferential creditors according to 
section 30(l)(b) and (c) of the Receiverships Act and the PPSA priority rules. The 
PPSA in some circumstances, will accord priority to do the holder of the general 
· · 88 secunty mterest. 
(b) PPSA priority rules and security interests over accounts receivable for 
which new value is provided 
According to the PPSA, the holder of a security interest m accounts 
receivable for which new value is provided has not always priority over the holder 
85 Keeper in Rt Hon Justice Blanchard, above 11 11 , I I I. 
86 Blanchard and Gedye, above 11 52, 178. 
87 See Gedye, above n 7, 229. 
88 See Brookers, above n 50, RA30 .02. 
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of a general security interest over the company's accounts receivable. According 
to the general priority rule of the PPSA, priority between perfected security 
interests in the same collateral is to be detennined by the order of the registration 
of a financing statement, or the taking into possession of the collateral or the 
temporary perfection of the security interest in accordance with the PPSA, 
depending on the nature of the collateral.89 For example, concerning a factor and a 
general secured creditor, the first-to-register priority rule of the PPSA would 
apply. If the general secured creditor was the first to register his security interest, 
the general secured creditor then has priority under the PPSA. 
(c) PPSA priority rules and PMSis 
Under the priority rules of the PPSA, the holder of a PMSA in inventory 
has priority over a general secured creditor, provided the PMSI holder has 
registered the PMSI in time and perfected it. An anomaly was therefore created 
where the holder of the PMSI did not register the PMSI in time. 
( d) Circular priorities in relation to inventory and accounts receivable 
In cases where a PMSI holder did not register and perfect his PMSI a 
stalemate situation was created. Regarding securities over accounts receivable, the 
problem arose where a general security interest holder perfected its security 
interest first. In these cases, the general secured creditor had priority over an 
assignee of accounts receivable or a PMSI holder,90 who had priority over a 
preferential creditor,9 1 who had priority over a general secured creditor.92 To 
remedy this inconsistency, the consequential amendment specified a "perfection" 
requirement for the security interests in the manner provided by the PPSA in order 
to have priority over preferential debts. 93 
89 S 66(b) of the PPSA. 
90 According to s 66(b) of the PPSA. 
9 1 According to Schedule 7, cl 2(l)(b), section 30(1) of the Receiverships Act. 
92 According to Schedule?, cl 2(l )(b), section 30(1 ) of the Receiverships Act, see Brown, above n 
40, 99. 
93 Companies Amendment Act 2006. 
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(e) New Schedule 7, clause 2(b) of the Act 
The new Schedule 7, clause 2(1 )(b)(i)(B) and (C) of the Act now provides 
that the PMSI or security interest over inventory or accounts receivable for new 
value must be perfected in accordance with the PPSA. The amendment reflects 
the policymakers' attempt to preserve the priority of preferential creditors out of 
assets which, normally, were the type of assets subject to a floating charge. 94 
(f) New section 30 of the Receiverships Act 
To avoid the priority circularities two amendments were necessary. The 
"perfection" requirement was introduced into 30(1 )(b) and ( c) of the 
Receiverships Act. A further amendment was necessary due to the special features 
of receivership. Section 30(2) of the Receiverships Act was drafted in a way 
which made the priority over preferential claims relate only to the security interest 
pursuant to which the receiver had been appointed. It did not require other secured 
creditors to concede priority to preferential creditors. The receiver had to pay 
preferential creditors before "before paying any claim of the person entitled to the 
security interest." As recently worded, it could happen that if a receiver was 
appointed by a subsequent secured creditor and the first secured creditor elected 
not to appoint its own receiver, preferential creditors ranked behind the claim of 
the first ranking secured creditor. 95 The problem was that this applied in all cases, 
whether the first ranking secured creditor had a security interest which was a 
PMSI or a security interest over accounts receivable for which new value was 
provided or whether it was a general security interest. 
The position has now been clarified by the direction in subsection 30(2A) 
of the Receiverships Act in the same language as Schedule 7, clause 2(1)(b)(i) of 
the Act. A receiver must apply the accounts receivable and inventory in paying 
the claimants under perfected PMSis and perfected transfers of accounts 
receivable for new value and also in paying preferential claimants, before paying 
94 Keeper in Rt Hon Justice Blanchard, above n 11 , 113 . 
95 Blanchard and Gedye, above n 52, 169. 
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the claims of any person under a security interest, other than PMSls or security 
interests over accounts receivable for new value. 96 
(g) Remaining circularity problem 
While the inconsistencies between the PPSA and the preferential creditor 
regime with regard to PMSis have been rectified by requiring the perfection of the 
security interest, circularity problems relating to security interests arising from the 
transfer of accounts receivable for which new value is provided remain. This 
problem existed already before the amendments with regard to Schedule 7, clause 
2 of the Act, and can now also arise under the Receiverships Act due to the 
amendments to subsections 30(2) and (2A) of the Receiverships Act. 
The general priority rule under the PPSA is that a perfected security 
interest has priority over an unperfected security interest in the same collateral. 97 
For most security interests the PPSA includes a first-to-register rule, which means 
that the person who registers his security interest first , has priority over later 
perfected security interests in the same collateral.98 PMSis are exceptions to this 
rule. Provided the PMSI holder has perfected the PMSI in inventory or its 
proceeds before the debtor obtains possession of the collateral, the PMSI holder 
has priority over the general secured creditor even if the general secured creditor 
perfected his security interest first. 99 However, the PPSA does not provide such an 
exception for the sale of accounts receivable. The priority rules of the PPSA do 
not concede priority for perfected security interests in accounts receivable for 
which new value is provided over earlier perfected general security interests in 
accounts receivable. If the general security interest was perfected first , the priority 
rules of the PPSA give priority to the perfected general security interest. 
In contrast, Schedule 7, clause 2(l)(b)(i)(C) of the Act and section 30(l)(c) 
of the Receiverships Act direct liquidators and receivers to apply accounts 
receivable to pay assignees of accounts receivable for new value whether or not an 
earlier registered general security interest exists. This is contrary to the priority 
96 Ibid. 
97 S 66(a) of the PPSA. 
98 S 66(b) of the PPSA, John Steadman " Super priority under the PPSA" [2007] NZLJ 207, 208 . 
99 S 74 of the PPSA . 
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rules of the PPSA and can lead to circular priorities. For example, the creditor 
with a security interest in the first rank is a creditor with a general security interest 
in accounts receivable. There is another creditor with a security interest arisen 
from the transfer of accounts receivable for which new value is provided, who 
perfected his security interest later, but before the commencement of the 
liquidation or the appointment of the receiver. Under the PPSA the general 
security interest holder has priority, while under the preferential creditors system 
the later perfected security interest over the accounts receivable has priority. 
Under the old section 30 of the Receiverships Act this problem did not 
occur because the preferential creditor priority rules did not apply to the first 
ranking secured creditor if a subsequent secured creditor had appointed the 
receiver. In these cases, the first ranking secured creditor had priority over 
preferential creditors even though the creditor had only a general security interest. 
Section 30 of the Receiverships Act and the PPSA had led to the priority of the 
general secured creditor if he had registered first. However, section 30 of the 
Receiverships Act now always gives priority to the holder of a security interest 
over accounts receivable for new value, if it was perfected before the appointment 
of the receiver. The holder of a general security interests in accounts receivable 
has to concede priority, even if he perfected his security interest first. 
However, the conflict between the direction of receivers and liquidators 
under the preferential creditor system to pay the assignee of the accounts 
receivable before the holder of a general security interest and the PPSA might not 
often arise in practice. Accounts receivable fmanciers can prevent this conflict if 
they obtain a contractual subordination from the holders of prior ranking general 
security interests. 100 The private reordering of priorities will prevent the 
conflict. 101 Without a priority agreement, the holder of a general security can 
avoid the loss of priority to an assignee of accounts receivable by personally 
collecting accounts receivable and excluding them from the assets in respect of 
which a receiver is appointed. 102 
100 Blanchard and Gedye, above n 52, 170. 
IOI Ibid. 
102 Ibid. 
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C Analysis 
The research reveals that the preferential priority system is complex and 
sometimes highly technical. Deciding which inventory and accounts receivable go 
to preferential creditors and which go to secured creditors, poses a difficult task. 
Jn some cases, receivers and liquidators will be obliged to undertake extremely 
difficult tracing exercises to determine which assets are subject to preferential 
creditor claims. Particularly with regard to section 30 of the Receiverships Act 
there are some remaining deficiencies which complicate the satisfaction of 
secured, unsecured and preferential creditors. These deficiencies are not so severe 
as they were before the amendments to Schedule 7 clause 2( 1 )(b) of the Act and 
to section 30 of the Receiverships Act. However, they still raise the question as to 
how the priority system could be made more simple or improved. 
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IV CRITICISM CONCERNING PREFERENTIAL POSITIONS 
The Companies Amendment Acts 2004 and 2006 were the first substantive 
amendments to the classes of preferential creditors contained in Schedule 7 of the 
Act since its coming into force in 1993. 103 The origin of many of the amendments 
can be found in the recommendations of the New Zealand Law Commission (Law 
Commission) made to the Ministry of Commerce, now the Ministry of Economic 
Development (MED), 104 and the subsequent Discussion Document of the MED.
105 
In 1998, the Law Commission was asked to investigate on whether existing 
classes of preferred creditors should continue to enjoy advantages over unsecured 
creditors when insolvency intervened. 
A Changes to Employees' Preferential Entitlements 
1 Companies Amendment Act 2004 
The Companies Amendment Act 2004 came into force on 29 May 2004. It 
introduced a definition of employee into the preferential creditor regime. 
Schedule 7, clause 3(4)(b) of the Act provides that 
Employee means any person of any age employed by an employer to do any work 
for hire or reward under a contract of service (including a homeworker as defined in 
section 5 of the Employment Relations Act 2000); but does not include a person who 
is, or was at any time during the 12 months before the commencement of the 
liquidation, a director of the company in liquidation, or a nominee or relative of, or a 
trustee for, a director of the company. 
The 2004 amendments also extended the coverage of employees' 
preferential claims to encompass compensation for redundancy. After a technical 
change to the wording, 106 Schedule 7, clause 1 (2)( c) of the Act now provides for 
redundancy payment owed to an employee that accrues before, or because of, the 
commencement of the liquidation. Additionally, employee priority was extended 
to awards made in personal grievances cases by the Employment Relations 
103 Trish Keeper "New Zealand's Corporate Insolvency Preferential Creditor Regime: An Analysis 
of recent Change to Employee Entitlements" (2005) 13 lnsolv LJ 227, 228. 
104 Law Commission, above n 26. 
105 Ministry of Economic Development (MEO) insolvency Law Review: Tier One Discussion 
Document Wellington, 200 I. 
106 Companies Amendment Act 2006. 
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Authority, Employment Court or Court of Appeal in respect of wages or other 
money or remuneration lost for the four-month period to liquidation. However, 
this does not include awards for humiliation, loss of dignity or injury to feelings, 
or loss of any benefit. 107 
Employees' entitlements other than any amount payable under the 
KiwiSaver Act 2006 or those specified under other enactments, 108 receive 
preferential status only for a limited amount. This cap was extended from $6,000 
to $15,000. The Companies Amendment Act 2004 also introduced a mechanism 
to adjust the cap every three years in accordance with changes in average weekly 
earnings. The maximum sum per employee currently amounts to $16,420. 109 
The Companies Amendment Act 2004 removed the priority of 
compensation under the Volunteers Employment Protection Act 1973 as it related 
to compensation of dismissal and no similar claims were entitled to priority. 110 
2 Companies Amendment Act 2006 
The Companies Amendment Act 2006 mainly affected other categories of 
preferential payments rather than employees' entitlements. 111 
The amendments extended the entitlements to amounts payable to the IRD 
to meet student loan repayment and child support obligations. 112 Student loan and 
child support deductions have been included into the general clause covering 
"amounts deducted by the company from the wages or salary of an employee in 
order to satisfy obligations of the employee". Additionally, a new government 
priority has been included into Schedule 7 of the Act in respect of deductions 
from wages or salary under the KiwiSaver Act 2006. 11 3 
The Companies Amendment Act 2006 removed preferential claims for 
compensation under the Workers Compensation Act 1956 and priorities 
applicable to apprentices. These priorities had become redundant because the 
107 Schedule 7, cl J(2)(e) of the Act, section 123(1)(c) of the Employment Relations Act 2000. 
108 Schedule 7, cl 1(2)(f) and (h) of the Act. 
109 Schedule 7, cl 3 of the Act, Companies (Maximw11 Priority Amount) Order2006 (SR 2006/284) 
came into force on 30 September 2006. 
11 0 See Law Commission, above n 26, paras 76 and 78. 
111 see above Chapter II B. 
11 2 Schedule 7, cl 1(2)(d) of the Act, see Brown and Telfer, above n 40, 94. 
11 3 Schedule 7, cl I (2)(g) of the Act. 
30 
protected categories now fall under the general definition of employees under the 
Employment Relations Act 2000. 114 
3 Employee related preferential entitlements 
Employee related preferential status now includes the following claims 
which rank equally between each other and abate in equal proportion, if there are 
insufficient funds to pay all of the claims of that class: 115 
Wages and salary owing for services provided in the four months prior to 
the commencement of liquidation or receivership; 11 6 Wages or salary of any 
employee is given preferential status whether or not earned wholly or in part by 
way of commission and whether payable for time or for piecework in respect of 
· 11 7 services; 
Any holiday pay accrued before or because of the commencement of 
liquidation 11 8 and any compensation for redundancy accrued before or because of 
the commencement of liquidation; 11 9 
Child support, student loan, and KiwiSaver deductions ; these amounts are 
deducted by the employer from the wages of the employee in order to satisfy 
obligations towards the Crown; 120 
Certain reimbursement for lost remuneration provided for, or ordered by 
the Employment Relations Authority or court in respect of wages lost in the four 
month period prior to commencement of liquidation; 
12 1 
Certain debts to lienors up to a maximum amount of $2,000 under section 
263(2) of the Act and any sums that are required to be paid by any other 
enactment as second level priority debts; the last category is not related to 
employees' entitlements and will barely have any impact. Preferences under the 
Radioconm1unications Act 1989 and under the Fisheries Act 1983 were removed. 
114 Brown and Telfer, above n 40, 94. 
11 5 Schedule 7 cl 2(1 )(a) of the Act. 
11 6 S ee above Chapter III B 4. 
11 7 Schedule 7, cl I (2)(a) of the Act. 
11 8 Schedule 7, cl 1(2)(b) of the Act. 
11 9 Schedule 7, cl 1(2)(c) of the Act. 
120 Schedule 7, cl I (2)(d) and (g) of the Act. KiwiSaver deductions are given equivalent priority, 
though they are not included within the general category of employee deductions . 
12 1 Schedule 7, cl 1(2)(e) of the Act. 
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The intention of the amendments was that new priorities will be incorporated in 
Schedule 7 of the Act. 122 
B Criticism concerning Employees' Entitlements 
The two most difficult issues affecting preferential treatment for 
employees are how to distinguish an employee from an independent contractor 
who is reliant upon a particular customer for work and the extent to which any 
protection afforded should be given. 123 
1 Definition of employee 
The first part of the new definition "being employed under a contract of 
service" is a codification of the existing law. 124 It emphasises the contractual form 
of the relationship. Uncertainty remains as to whether the real nature of the 
relationship is the key factor for deciding if the person is an employee and 
qualifies as a preferential creditor. In contrast to Schedule 7, clause 3(4) of the 
Act, the definition of "employee" in the Employment Relations Act 2000 
explicitly includes the direction to decide on the real nature of the relationship 
rather than to treat any document or statement between the parties as definitive. 125 
Therefore, it is uncertain whether the insolvency administrator has to consider all 
relevant matters, like the day-to-day control, the level of economic risk, the level 
of independence and the integrity of the work to the nature of the business. For 
example, this is relevant in cases where a person is described as self-employed, 
but worked exclusively for the insolvent company. 126 
The definition of employee now excludes persons who are or were 
directors of the company from qualifying as preferential creditors. The Law 
Commission explained that director-employees have access to financial 
information about the company on an ongoing basis, and will also be involved in 
the decision-making process of the company. The arguments for preferential 
status that employees are vulnerable and lack information or power in the 
122 See Brown and Telfer, above n 40, 95 . 
123 Heath, above n 4, 45. 
124 See Don Mackiru10n "Employment entitlement in receivership" [2003] NZLJ 197, 197 . 
125 S 6(2) of the Employment Relations Act 2000. 
126 K eeper, above n 103,234. 
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bargaining relationship do not apply to director-employees. 127 The MED endorsed 
the exclusion of director-employees and added that this change would also 
provide an incentive for prudent director conduct. 128 One difficulty with this 
approach is that companies vary in nature. There are also small family businesses 
and medium entities, whose directors might be worthy of protection. Unjust result 
can especially occur for relatives of directors who are also excluded from 
preferential status. This approach discounts, in some cases, the extent to which 
directors are able to inform themselves concerning the insolvency risk and to 
influence financial risky situations. 129 
2 Compensation for redundancy 
The extension of priority to compensation for redundancy was significant 
m principle, in that traditionally preferential status was only granted to pre-
commencement debts. 130 Redundancy payments are compensation for the loss of a 
job and the opportunity to earn through its disestablishment as being superfluous. 
The basis of redundancy entitlements is compensation, not remuneration. 131 
Redundancy pay is contractually agreed compensation from the employer, usually 
based on length of service to remove some of the employees' immediate financial 
disadvantages associated with losing their job. 132 
The legislator decided that the rights of employees to be compensated for 
loss of the opportunity to earn have priority over the rights of trade and other 
unsecured creditors. One of the stated reasons for this decision was that 
"frequently employee debts make up a relatively small percentage of the total 
debts owed by an insolvent entity." 133 However, no research on the likely impact 
127 Law Commission, above n 26, para 52. 
128 MED, above n 105, para 83. 
129 See Vanessa Finch Co,porate Insolvency Lall': Perspectives and Principles (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2002) 437 . 
130 Brown and Telfer, above n 40, 93. 
13 1 Re NZ Secifarers' Union Retirement and Welfare Plans [1996) 1 ERNZ 259, McGechan J. 
132 Joint Insolvency Committee Status of Redundancy Payment Bill - Submission to the Labour 
Select Committee 1994, para 2. Joint lnsolvency Committee was set up by the New Zealand 
Society of Accountants and the New Zealand Law Society to consider issues of the insolvency law 
reform . 
133 Harre ', above n 31. 
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in New Zealand or the effects after the inclusion of retrenchment payment m 
Australia was provided to justify this assertion. 134 
The issue of granting preferential entitlements to redundancy payments has 
been the subject of general community concern. 135 To determine which debt 
should be afforded preferential status, the Law commission reverted to the basic 
principles. The priority must be justified on principles of fairness and justice, 
which can be applied in any given case. 136 The MED further explained that the 
principle of equal sharing should prevail unless it can be shown that the public 
interest in providing greater protection to creditors outweighs the economic and 
social costs of any such entitlements. 137 
It is difficult to identify compelling reasons for a higher priority for 
redundancy payments than for other debts owing to unsecured creditors. In 
contrast to redundancy payments, claims for unpaid wages and salary relate to 
labour provided to the company. Redundancy payments are due even if the 
employee finds a new employment immediately. 13 8 Furthermore, redundancy 
payments are of discretionary and indeterminate nature. The Law Commission 
and MED were also concerned that trading and unsecured creditors could be 
disproportionately prejudiced by the redundancy claims of employees. 139 Priority 
for redundancy payments will leave less for unsecured creditors. This could 
challenge the economic efficiency of insolvency law. 140 
3 Need for additional protection 
There is general consensus that employees need protection in the event of 
their employer's insolvency. 141 By enlarging the cap for employee preferential 
entitlements and including redundancy payments, the legislator tried to address 
this need. However, on the one hand it has been shown, that regarding redundancy 
payments do not properly fit into the preferential creditor system. On the other 
134 Keeper, above n 103, 239. 
135 Ibid, 237. 
136 Law Commission, above n 26, para 19, Insolvency Law Review Committee (UK), above n 24, 
para 1398. 
137 MEO, above n I 05 , 84. 
138 Joint insolvency Committee, above n 132, para 2. 
139 MEO, above n I 05, 84. 
140 S ee below Chapter IV 0 . 
141 See above Chapter II C. 
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hand, the extension of protections does not help employees if there are no or 
insufficient assets left. Preferential entitlement cannot address the need to protect 
employees, where the assets are not sufficient to meet the claims of preferential 
creditors. Beyond the initial impact for employees losing their job and income 
source, they will often find that the owed money will not be easy to obtain.
142 
After the payment of secured creditors there is likely to be little left, and the 
payment of preferential creditors might be a small proportion of the entitlement. 
There are no statistics provided for New Zealand, but for example in Canada and 
the United Kingdom employees typically recover only about 15 cents for each 
dollar owed in wages. 143 
142 Michael Salter "A sting in the tail" (2008) 158 NU 320, 320. 
143 National Union of public and general employees " Bankruptcy protection fund for workers will 
be operating soon" (19 December 2007) http: \\'WW.nupge.ca (accessed 30 September 2008). 
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C Criticism concerning Crown Preferential Status 
I Crown preferential debts 
There are two categories into which Crown debts fall for preferential 
purposes. First, the Crown has priority under the second highest class of 
preferential priority for three types of amounts deducted from wages or salary of 
an employee. 144 The employer is required to act as the collection agent for the 
Crown to satisfy obligations under the Child Support Act 1991, the Student Loan 
Scheme Act 1992 and the KiwiSaver Act 2006. 
Second, the Crown has preferential entitlements to outstanding taxes and 
duties, namely GST, PAYE, RWT, NRWT and Customs duty. 145 These revenue 
debts rank after all other classes of preferential debt, but still before general 
secured and unsecured creditors and without any cap on these payments. 
The preferential status of the Crown is strongly supposed. The issue has 
attracted considerable public attention and generated many submissions calling 
for removal. 146 The Law Commission had recommended that the preferential 
entitlements to GST, custom duties and levies payable to the Crown be abolished. 
However, the legislator abolished preferential status only for insubstantial revenue 
debts, namely the preferential entitlements to levies under the Fisheries Act 
1996 147 and the Radiocommunications Act 1983. 148 
2 Criticism 
The government has based the retention of preferential entitlement on 
several reasons. 149 In the following, these reasons will be analysed and counter-
arguments will be considered. 
(a) Need to protect the revenue of the Crown 
The government argued that it is necessary to continue with the existing 
Crown preferential debts in order to maintain the government's revenue base so 
144 Schedule 7, cl 1(2)(d) and (g) of the Act. 
145 Schedule 7, cl 1(5) of the Act. 
146 Keeper in Rt Hon Justice Blanchard, above n 11 , 108. 
147 S 274 of the Fisheries Act 1996. 
148 S 183(4) of the Radiocommunications Act 1989. 
149 See above Chapter II C. 
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that it can further other social and economic objectives. 150 Unpaid tax undermines 
the integrity of the revenue base and is a loss to all members of society. 151 
However, unlike ordinary unsecured creditors, the Crown has an array of 
enforcement powers to collect tax and to impose penalties and interest in order to 
protect the revenue. For example, the Commissioner oflnland Revenue (CIR) has 
significant powers to impose penalties for non-payment of tax under section 139 
of the Tax Administration Act 1994. Concerning tax deductions made by the 
employer under the PAYE rules, the CIR has the power to require a third party to 
pay a debt from monies held on behalf of the taxpayer. 152 The CIR is also 
protected by the possibility to seek orders from the High Court for the recovery of 
PAYE or RWT even though no judgement may have been entered against the 
debtor. 153 This is due to the fact that unpaid tax deductions are made a charge on 
all real and personal property of the person. 154 The CIR is in the best position to 
determine when the debtor is getting into financial difficulties, if returns are made 
regularly. 155 If returns are not made, the CIR is also the first to notice it. 
(b) Taxes are owed to the community rather than to the individual 
Another common argument is that taxes are owed to the community rather 
than to the individual. However this argument can be outweighed by assuming 
that the priority of tax debts over other unsecured creditors can hinder a 
company's recovery. 156 If the recovery of a company fails , this will indirectly 
have an impact on other public fields, including the protection of employment. 
Business failure, recession and protection of employment can also be seen as 
being in the public interest. 
(c) CIR is an involuntary creditor 
The Law Co1m11ission was not persuaded by the argument that the CIR has 
a statutory relationship with the taxpayer and is an involuntary creditor. The 
150 Harre ', above n 31 . 
15 1 MED, above n 105, 75. 
152 S 157 of the Tax Administration Act 1994. 
153 Law Commission, above n 26, para 99. 
154 Ss 169 and 172 of the Tax Administration Act 1994. 
155 
Heath, above n 4, 49. 
156 See below Chapter IV D. 
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legislator chose that the CIR will collect tax on its behalf. Even more importantly, 
even if the CIR is an involuntary creditor, there are many involuntary creditors 
that are not accorded preferential status, for example victims of a tort. 157 
( d) Quasi-trust nature 
Some of the debts, notably PAYE, RWT, NRWT, and the employee's 
wage deductions represent monies payable by the debtor to the CIR on behalf of 
another person and are therefore of a quasi-trust nature. The Law commission 
emphasised that it would be unjust to allow those funds to be used for trade 
creditors. The assets of the insolvent would be swollen with monies which the 
debtor ought to have paid to the CIR on behalf of a third party. This money had 
never belonged to the debtor company, but was hold quasi on trust on behalf of 
the Crown. Additionally, taxpayers might have ordered their affairs on the 
assumption that payments to the revenue have been made. 158 
This applies to RWT and NRWT as they represent a class of "on behalf 
of' tax collections. PAYE deductions from the employees ' wages are also 
regarded as being held on trust for the Crown. However, the Law Commission 
made clear that priority can only be justified to the extent to which claims for 
unpaid wages are given priority. 159 Priority should therefore be limited to PA YE 
payable on the sum of $16,420, which is the cap for employees ' preferential 
entitlements. 160 
Regarding GST or customs duty, the Law Commission pointed out that the 
quasi-trust argumentation does not apply. GST is not of a quasi trust nature, as 
there is no necessary correlation between the GST paid on the sale of the goods 
and the GST claimed on the purchase of the raw materials used to make the 
goods. A company is not holding GST in trust for the Crown from the time of 
receipt until the time ofretum. If the cost of making goods for sale is made up of 
raw materials purchased and labour, a credit will only have been recovered in 
157 Law Commission, above n 26, para 141. 
158 Ibid , paras 132 and 146. 
159 The Law Commission recommended that the PA YE preference, as such , be aboli shed . Instead a 
gross priority for wages plus the PA YE component should be enacted. 1l1is change will not 
disadvantage employees, but will limit the Commi ssioner 's priority for PA YE. 
160 Law Commi ssion, above n 26, paras 114, 115 and 132. 
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respect of the non-labour portion. Additionally, there is no obligation under the 
Goods and Services Tax Act 1985 to keep GST money separate from other 
monies of the debtor company. 161 The Law Commission therefore recommended 
that the preferential entitlement for GST and customs duty be abolished. 
(e) Paripassurule 
The pari passu rule is likely to be undermined by the granting of 
preferential status to Crown debts. 162 Statistics of the Inland Revenue Department 
in 1998 provide a breakdown of outstanding preferential and non-preferential debt 
in bankruptcy and liquidation. The statistics shows that the total amount of 
preferential tax claimed for bankruptcy and liquidations as at 4 October 1998 
accounted for about $35 million, whereof goods and services tax claims were the 
largest part with about 80 percent and a total amount of $28 million. 163 The huge 
amount of tax debts leads in many cases to the fact, that there is very little of 
nothing left for unsecured creditors. Priority of Crown debts therefore provides a 
substantial disadvantage for unsecured creditors. This is contrary to the pari passu 
rule.164 
According to a document of the IRD, only an amount of $5 million per 
annum is gathered by the IRD under their preferential status. 165 However, it can 
be argued that the tax debts of inso ]vent companies are insignificant to the Crown 
when set against the shortfall suffered by ordinary trade creditors and the decisive 
influence in several insolvencies. 166 Revenue-related preferential debts made up 
about 60 per cent of the total debt owed by companies in liquidation. 167 
161 Law Commission, above n 26, para 138. 
162 Australian Law Reform Commission, above n 9, para 33. 
163 Statistics provided by the Law Commission, above n 26, Appendix D Revenue statistics -
claims in bankruptcy and liquidations as at 4 October 1998. 
164 Australian Law Reform Commission, above n 9, para 33. 
165 Hon Pansy Wong Parliamenta,y Debates - Part 8 of the Insolvency Lall' Refo,m Bi// (24 
October 2006) 29 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates. p 6051 . 
166 See Chapter IV D. 
167 Munt, Compromises in Nell' Zealand: Vices and Virtues (1999) TNSOL Pacific 99 Conference 
(Auckland). 
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(f) Success of voluntary administration 
A further concern arose with the introduction of the voluntary 
administration regime in Part 15 A of the Act. Voluntary administration was 
introduced to compensate business failures and to avoid liquidation. As the Crown 
is often the largest unsecured creditor, the IRD will be able to effectively vote 
against any Deeds of Company Arrangement (DOCA) unless it was accorded its 
statutory priority within the DOCA. 168 The IRD has no strong interest to negotiate 
a compromise where it is likely that all or part of the tax debts can be obtained as 
a preferential creditor in receivership or liquidation. 
(g) Priority is a disincentive to collect debts more quickly 
The primary reason which persuaded the Australian Law Commission to 
recommend the abolition of Crown preferential debts was that the priority assures 
payment. It consequently operates as a disincentive for the CIR to recover debts in 
a quickly commercial manner choosing to instigate insolvency proceedings before 
the level of indebtedness increases further. 169 If the CIR is allowed debts to 
aggregate the position of other unsecured creditors can be seriously 
disadvantaged. This may result in a situation where ordinary creditors are 
prepared to provide credit to a company that is in apparent financial health but is 
actually carrying a huge liability tax. 170 
The quasi-trust argument for preferential status of certain Crown debts has 
to be weighed up with the counterarguments and the pari passu principle. It is 
difficult to see why the Crown should be placed in any better position than other 
unsecured creditors. To the maximum extent as possible, the principle of equal 
distribution should be maintained. It would encourage the effective administration 
of insolvent estates. 171 
168 
Brown and Telfer, above n 40, 88. 
169 Australian Law Reform Commission, above n 9, paras 734 and 735. 
170 Ibid. 
171 S ee below Chapter IV D. 
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D Efficiency of Insolvency law 
The granting and the extension of preferential status inevitably means that 
there are substantially fewer funds available to meet the claims of general trading 
and other unsecured creditors. The Law Commission and the MED explained that 
this could challenge the economic efficiency of insolvency law. 
Fewer funds left for unsecured creditors reduce the ability of a company to 
make a proposal to its creditors in the corporate rescue context. 172 If the 
possibility that unsecured creditors get paid is small, the chance of restructuring 
the company by means of compromises or voluntary administration is also small . 
Unsecured creditors may often not take an active interest in the administration of 
the insolvency because all the proceedings of any recovery will go to preferential 
creditors. 173 The requirement to pay preferential creditors before general secured 
and unsecured creditors can therefore prevent the effective reorganisation and 
recovery of insolvent estates. This can affect the continuing employment 
prospects of employees. 
Fewer funds available to meet the claims of general trading and other 
unsecured creditors could also have an impact on the cost and availability of 
credit, particularly for small companies. This can also reduce opportunities for 
some compames to expand and decrease mcome and employment 
opportunities. 174 The significance of the problem needs to be regarded against the 
background that insolvencies tend to increase when the economy weakens and the 
availability of credit is already reduced. 
175 
There are no statistics available for the recovery rate of unsecured 
creditors in New Zealand. However, statistics published in Canada in 1995 reveal 
that on average only 16 percent of the assets were left for unsecured creditors, 
though their debts accounted for 62 percent of the total debts. This led to a 
172 See Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy and Insolvency (Canada - Chairman Mr G F Colter) 
Proposed Bankruptcy Act Amendments - Colter Report 1986, 77, 78. 
173 
Ibid. 
174 MEO, above n 105, 84, Joint Insolvency Committee, above n 132, para 2. 
175 Margaret Smith - Law and Government Division Canada "Protecting Employee Wages in 
Bankruptcy" 2002 Parliamentary Research Branch (PRB) 01-34E, I. 
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recovery rate of five percent for unsecured creditors. 176 However, unsecured 
creditors, especially small trade creditors, in most cases cannot calculate this risk 
and are not able to provide for it. 
Regarding the efficiency of insolvency law, a tension therefore exists 
between the granting of preferential status to Crown debts and the extent of the 
preferential entitlement of employees on the one hand and the need to ensure that 
preferential claims do not cause undue detriment to other creditors. 
176 Jakob S Ziegel "Preferences and Priorities in Insolvency Law: ls there a solution?" ( I 995) 39 
St. Louis University Law Journal , 792, 806. 
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V PROPOSALS 
The research shows that there is a need to improve the current preferential 
creditor system. There is justifiably severe criticism with regard to the two largest 
groups of preferential creditors, employees and the Crown. 177 Additionally, the 
preferential creditor priority rules involve a complicated structure and are partly 
inconsistent with the PPSA. 178 The following proposals regard how other 
countries, especially those of the commonwealth deal with the preferential 
creditor issue and which approaches they have undertaken. While the first 
proposals will address the technical deficiencies in the preferential creditor 
system, the subsequent proposals will concentrate on a more general review that is 
whether changes to the existing preferences should be made. 
A Unified Preferential Creditor Regime 
One idea to correct obscurities of the current preferential creditor regime is 
to put the preferential creditor system for liquidations and receiverships together 
in one Act as an annex to the PPSA. 179 This would solve problems in cases in 
which receivership and liquidation overlap. Difficulties because of the different 
wording like "extent of the security interest" under section 30(1) of the 
Receiverships Act would not occur anymore. Additionally, clarifications should 
be made concerning whether and what kind of "proceeds" are covered by the 
preferential creditor system. 
However, this would not solve the inconsistencies between the PPSA and 
the preferential creditor system with regard to the remaining circularity problem. 
This inconsistency can only be solved if the preferential creditor priority system is 
adapted to the priority rules of the PPSA which would include that preferences 
which existed prior to the PPSA would have to be changed. 
B Super-priority 
Currently, preferential creditors have priority over certain, but not all 
secured creditors. A similar system exists in Australia and the United Kingdom. 
177 See above Chapter IV. 
178 See above Chapter III. 
179 See Gedye, above n 64, 313. 
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Preferential creditors, at least employees, traditionally have priority over debts 
secured by a floating charge, but rank below debts secured by a fixed charge. 180 
An idea to simplify the preferential creditor system could be to either give 
preferential creditors priority over all secured creditors or to position them after 
all secured creditors. 181 
The latter approach was undertaken in Canada until July 2008. Preferential 
creditors had to concede priority to all secured creditors. However, the preferential 
position would be undermined in cases where the debts are higher than the 
securities and not all secured creditors get paid. Being positioned after all secured 
interests including general security interests over inventory and accounts 
receivable would in cases of doubt mean that preferential creditors don't get paid 
at all or at least not in the amount of their preferential entitlement. This would be 
quite unjust with regard to the fees and expenses of liquidators and receivers. 
Secured creditors have as well an interest in liquidators and receivers doing their 
job properly and getting paid for it. Even more importantly, it would be contrary 
to the general opinion that employees are worthy of protection and the tendency 
that they need more protection than currently provided. 182 Canada changed its 
system so that employees now get satisfied from the "current assets" including 
cash, short-term investments, inventory and accounts receivable and therefore 
have priority over certain secured creditors. 183 
The other approach to give preferential creditors priority over all secured 
creditors would place employee entitlements ahead of all other claims. However, 
granting a super-priority to unpaid wages and employee entitlements would affect 
the priority position of all secured creditors and is likely to reduce the availability 
of credit. The reason for this is that bank lending policies would likely become 
more restrictive if they were to lose their priority status. 184 Additionally, a super-
priority does not guarantee that employees will recover the wages owed to them, 
if the assets are insufficient to meet all outstanding wage claims. 
180 Sees 561 Corporations Act 200l(AUS). 
181 See Smith, above n 175, C I a. 
18? - See Chapter IV B 3. 
183 Amendments to the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) which took effect on 7 July 2008 . 
184 See Smith, above n 175, C 1 a. 
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C Alternatives.for Employees 
The first two proposals for how to deal with the preferential creditors 
system can sort out some of the deficiencies, but they do not take the criticism 
into account regarding the preferential status itself To address this criticism, a 
more far-reaching and fundamental approach is necessary. 
I Protection fund for employees 
The aim of protecting employees is in the public interest. Therefore, this aim 
might be better accomplished through social welfare legislation than through 
priorities created in insolvency law. This applies especially to redundancy 
payments whose preferential status barely fits the preferential creditor system. 
185 
Countries which chose to protect employees through social welfare legislation 
usually created a wage earner protection fund. Wage earner protection schemes 
ensure that employees will receive unpaid wages and other entitlements on an 
employer's insolvency. The creation of such a fund would alleviate the immediate 
needs of the employees. The fund could be financed either by contributions from 
employers and employees or by government through tax revenue.
186 
Wage earner protection funds have, for example, been established in Australia, 
Canada, the European Community countries, Norway, Switzerland, Israel, 
Argentina, and partially in the United States of America.
187 
In New Zealand, there is no employee's protection fund or other insurance 
scheme which provides a separate pool of assets for employees. This might be due 
to the recommendation of the MED not to introduce such a fund. However, the 
Law Commission in its advisory report to the MED mentioned that there is 
widespread support for such funds. 188 The Law Commission did not specifically 
consider the introduction of a wage earner protection fund as it did not fall within 
its tenns ofreference, but the Law Commission stated that it has to be considered, 
185 See above Chapter IV B 2. 
186 Australian Law Reform Commission , above n 9, paras 723 and 724. 
187 Christopher Symes" Workers ' Entitlements: the Government's Options - A social safety net 
for workers in employer insolvency" [2000] AltLJ 3. 
188 Law Commission, above n 26, para 88. 
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whether the establishment of a fund would be a better means of securing the 
protection for the vulnerable employees at whom the priority is directed.
189 
2 Wage earner protection systems 
The Australian Law Commission, 190 the British Committee on Insolvency 
Law and Practice, 191 and the Canadian Committee on Bankruptcy and 
Insolvency 192 recommended the introduction of a Wage Earner Protection Fund in 
their reports on preferential claims. 
(a) Australia 
In 2000, the Australian Government established the Employee Entitlement 
Support Scheme (EESS). In 2001, the government reviewed the scheme and 
created a new government-funded employee entitlement scheme by replacing the 
EESS with the General Employee Entitlement Redundancy Scheme (GEERS) in 
relation to insolvencies occurring on or after 12 September 2001.
193 The fund is 
financed by the taxpayers. The GEERS covers up to three months unpaid wages, 
all unpaid annual leave, all unpaid payment in lieu of notice, and unpaid 
redundancy entitlement up to a maximum of 16 weeks. In calculating entitlements 
a maximum annual wage is used. The Maximum Annual Wage for 2008-2009 is 
$106,400 or a weekly wage of $2039.62. 
194 Eligible are employees rather than 
contractors, subcontractors or agents. It does not matter whether the employee 
was remunerated by salary, wages, commissions, or otherwise. 
195 The Department 
of Employment and Workplace Relations forwards the GEERS advance to the 
insolvency practitioner. The insolvency practitioner deducts any tax or obligations 
189 Law Commission, above n 26, 89. 
190 Australian Law Reform Commission , above n 9, para 727. 
19 1 Insolvency Law Review Committee (UK), above n 24, para 1398. 
192 Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy and Insolvency (Canada), above n 172, 31-34. 
193 Australian Department of Employment and Workplace Relations, General Employee 
Entitlement and Redundancy Scheme Operational A..1Tangements; GEERS does not operate w1der 
legislation. The rules of GEERS are outlined in the GEERS Operational Arrangements, available 
at www.workplace.gov.au/workplace. Programmes EmployeeEntitlements (accessed 30 September 
2008). 
194 Ibid . 
195 GEERS Operational Arrangements 6 and 7. 
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under the Higher Education Loan Program (HELP) and then pays the 
employee. 196 
(b) United Kingdom 
The National Insurance Fund provides for the payment of outstanding 
employee entitlements as provided under the Employment Rights Act 1996 
(ERA). 197 The fund is mainly funded by employers and employees through 
National Insurance Contribution. These provisions implement obligations under 
the European Community Insolvency Protection Directive 80/987/EEC amended 
by the Directive 2002/74/EC. 198 Under this directive member states have to set up 
and finance guarantee institutions to ensure a degree of State guaranteed financial 
protection for employees if their employer becomes insolvent. 
The entitlements under Part 12 of the ERA include unpaid wages up to 
eight weeks, holiday pay for up to 6 weeks, payment for notice given, or for an 
employer's failure to give proper notice, a basic award of compensation for unfair 
dismissal made by an employment tribunal and reasonable repayment of any fee 
or premium paid by an apprentice or articled clerk. 199 All but the last of these 
debts are subject to a limit on the amount that can be paid in relation to any one 
week. The maximum payment for a week cu1Tently stands at £330 (£310 before 1 
February 2008).200 Employees may also be entitled to redundancy pay under the 
separate provisions of Part XI of the ERA.20 1 Eligible are employees who work 
under a contract of employment and who are not agency workers, short term 
casual workers, freelancers or self-employed. The Secretary of State for Business, 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform is responsible for making payments from the 
National Insurance Fund under the insolvency provisions of the 1996 Act. The 
Redundancy Payments Offices (RPOs) cany out this function on behalf of the 
Secretary of State. The RPOs will deduct from the a1Tears of wage payments and 
196 Australian Department of Employment and Workplace Relations, above n 193 . 
197 Part XII of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA). 
198 Article 3 of the European Community Insolvency Protection Directive 80/987/EEC. 
199 S 184 of the ERA. 
200 S 186( 1) of the ERA. 
20 1 Ss 135-1 8 1 ofthe ERA. 
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holiday payments an amount of income tax and the employee's share of Earnings 
Related ational Insurance Contrib ut ions (ERNIC).202 
(c) Canada 
Recently, Canada introduced a Wage Earner Protection Program. The 
Wage Earner Protection Program Act (WEEPA) took effect on 7 July 2008 . The 
governmental financed program203 guarantees payment of unpaid wages and 
earned vacation pay up to $3 ,000 or the equivalent of four weeks ' maximum 
insurable earnings under the Employment Insurance Act depending on which is of 
the greatest value. 204 Eligible are individuals who had an employment with the 
employer. 205 Excluded are individuals who had a controlling interest in the 
insolvent business during the period in which wages were earned in respect of 
those wages. Similarly, an individual who was an officer or director of the former 
employer or who has occupied a managerial position if the responsibilities 
included making binding financial decisions affecting the business of the former 
employer or decisions with respect to the payment or the non-payment of wages 
by the former employer. 206 The Wage Earner Protection Program will be 
administered by the Labour Program of Human Resources and Social 
Development Canada and delivered through Service Canada. 
207 Payments made 
under the Program will be reduced by applicable income taxes and other 
deductions. 208 
(d) Analysis 
All protection funds guarantee payment of wages and holiday pay. 
Redundancy payments are covered directly by the Australian Scheme, and in a 
separate scheme in the United Kingdom, while Canada does not provide a fund 
202 Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Redundancy and Insoh ·ency - A 
Guide for Jnsoh·ency Practitioners to employees' rights on the insolvency of their employer (8ed. 
2005) 
http:/ www.in solvencv, go\' .uk/guidanceleaflets redundancypavments guide forips guideforips.htm 
(accessed 30 September 2008). 
203 Goverrunent of Canada "Wage Earner Protection Program Regulations - Regulatory Impact 
Analysis Statement" (7 Jw1e 2008) Vol. 142 Canada Gazette No 23 . 
204 S 7 of the Wage Earner Protection Program Act 2008 (WEPPA) 
205 S 5 of the WEPPA. 
206 S 6 of the WEPPA . 
207 See Government of Canada, above n 203 . 
208 Ibid. 
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for them. either option guarantees full payment of all entitlements but promises 
that a maximum level would be set to provide a ' fair and reasonable ' level of 
protection. 209 In any case, neither of the schemes removes the right of employees 
to sue their employers for the full amount owed but not paid. Payments made 
under all of the schemes are reduced by applicable income taxes. Insofar the 
governments protect themselves as well as the employees. While the fund is 
financed by the government from general tax revenues in Australia and Canada, it 
is financed by employers and employees in the United Kingdom. 
The main advantage of wage earner protection schemes is the guarantee 
that employees will receive unpaid wages and other entitlements on an employer ' s 
insolvency. It has been shown that the assets are often not sufficient to meet the 
employees ' claims. 2 10 The Canadian Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy and 
Insolvency emphasised that no other solution ensures prompt and certain payment 
to employees. 2 11 The payment will be given much earlier than payments under the 
insolvency distribution process.2 12 Delays in paying employees due to the time 
involved in realising the employer ' s assets can cause increased difficulty in an 
already financially disadvantaged position. This argument preponderates 
especially where the event of insolvency appeared surprisingly for the employee. 
The Australian Law Commission identified further advantages such as the 
reduction in the amount of litigation over priorities and the reduction in 
administration costs.2 13 
3 Concerns 
The main concern against the establishment of a wage earner protection 
fund is the problem of financing such a fund. It is argued that the creation of such 
a fund would be an undue imposition on successful businesses or would 
additionally burden the national budget and the taxpayers respectively. Costs will 
occur under three headings, namely benefit payments to eligible employees, 
209 Minister of Employment, Workplace Relations and Small Business (Australia , Reith Peter) 
Ministerial Discussion Paper - The Protection of Employee Entitlements in the Event of Employer 
Insolvency, issued in August ( 1999). 
210 See above Chapter IV B 3. 
2 11 Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy and Insolvency (Canada), above n 172, 31-34. 
2 12 Margaret Smith, above n 175, C 2c. 
213 Australian Law Reform Commission , above n 9, para 723 . 
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administrative expenses, and payments to insolvency professionals. 2 14 The costs 
are significant. The Australian Ministerial Discussion Paper suggested an overall 
cost to government in the order of $100 million a year by a calculation of 10 
percent administrative costs, and some savings from the social security section of 
the national budget.2 15 The Canadian Wage Earner Protection Program counts on 
costs of $35 million to the government.2 16 These different amounts are due to the 
fact that the Canadian entitlements are limited to wages up to about 4 weeks and 
to a far smaller maximum weekly earning. For New Zealand the total amount 
would be much smaller given the difference in population. However, per capita 
the amount would be roughly the same depending on the limits to the 
entitlements. However, a fund would spread the burden of paying the claims of 
employees among all employers and employees or taxpayers. Due to the fact that 
the protection schemes limit the amount which employee can recover, the benefit 
payment costs will be manageable.2 17 With regard to collection costs limited 
government resources would be required by using the taxation system to collect 
the contributions, given that the administrative structure exists already. 2 18 
Payments to insolvency professionals are outweighed by the reduction m 
administration costs due to a limited amount of preferential creditors.2 19 
Further critique postulates that fund contributions would be an undue 
imposition upon successful business, as the costs might fall on sectors with no 
employees or employees who would never benefit form the fund .220 This would 
apply to employees of institutions such as municipalities and school boards. This 
argument can support the financing of the fund by contributions of employers and 
employees rather than by tax revenue, but it is not an argument against the 
establishment of a fund itself 
Another concern is the potential for abuse by employers who might avoid 
their legal obligations to employees because they know that a wage guarantee 
2 14 Government of Canada , above n 203 . 
2 15 See Minister of Employment, Workplace Relations and Small Business, above n 209. 
2 16 Government of Canada, above n 203. 
2 17 Australian Law Reform Commission, above n 9, paras 723-725. 
2 18 See Symes, above n 187. 
2 19 See above Chapter V C 2 d. 
220 See Australian Law Reform Commission, above n 9, para 723 . 
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scheme is in place.221 However, the fund guarantees only a specific amount of the 
entitlements and does not remove the right to sue the employer for the full 
amount. Additionally, this concern can be smoothed out by the implementation of 
fines and personal civil liability for directors. For example, in Canada directors of 
a company can be liable personally for employee related debts on the insolvency 
of the company. 222 Under the Canadian Business Corporations Act (CBCA), 
directors are jointly and severally liable to employees for up to six months unpaid 
wages, subject to a due diligence defence. 223 
4 Preferential status for subrogated claims 
Under the wage earner protection systems of Australia, the United 
Kingdom and Canada, the fund assumes all the rights and remedies of the 
employee with respect to payments made from the fund. 224 Where an employee is 
paid from the fund, the fund automatically takes over the employee's rights to 
recover that amount or obliges the employee to transfer his rights. It is appropriate 
that subrogation is included in the schemes so that the fund can be recovered. 
Additionally, a waiver of subrogation would unjustly privilege defaulting 
employers. 
The question arises as to whether preferential status should remain for 
these subrogation purposes. Under the protection funds of Australia, the United 
Kingdom and Canada, the subrogation rights include any right of priority 
conferred under insolvency legislation.225 That means the fund has the same rights 
as the employee to be paid in priority to the employer's other preferential and 
unsecured creditors. The retention of preferential status for subrogated claims 
might reduce the costs and contributions for providing the fund. However, the 
recovery rate seems to be relatively small. The United Kingdom recovery rate is 
suggested to be at 15 percent, while the recovery rate of most of the other 
European countries seems to be I O percent and lower.226 
22 1 See Margaret Smith, above n 175, C 2c. 
222 S 119 of the Canadian Business Corporations Act (CBCA). 
223 S 119(1) of the CBCA. 
22 4 S 89 ERA, GEERS Operational Arrangements and s 36( I) of the WEPP A. 
225 Ibid. 
226 See Minister of Employment, Workplace Relations and Small Business, above n 209. 
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This money could be used more efficiently for the distribution among 
general secured and unsecured creditors. Having more money left for these 
creditors, would make the insolvency system more efficient. Enlarging the assets 
of general secured and unsecured creditors would encourage pre-insolvency 
arrangements and raise the creditors' confidence in the insolvency laws by 
treating all unsecured creditors equally. 227 If the possibility that these creditors get 
paid is small, the chance of restructuring the company is also small. 228 
Additionally, the advantages, such as the decrease in the amount of 
litigations over priorities and in administration costs, would not occur. If the 
government stands in the employee's place as a preferred creditor, the problems 
arising with the current preferential creditor regime would be transferred and 
distorted. Both the technical issues and the problem regarding the efficiency of 
insolvency law would still occur. 
The Australian Law Commission emphasised that the interests of other 
unsecured creditors should not be overlooked when determining how the fund 
should work. It therefore recommended that the fund should have a right to be 
subrogated to the claims of employees, but should rank equally with other 
creditors.229 In the same way, the Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice of 
the United Kingdom had no doubt that an elaborate system of priorities is the 
cause of much public dissatisfaction, and that there is a widespread demand for a 
significant reduction or even a complete elimination of preferential debts.230 There 
is a potential that extended preferential debts of employees will prevent the 
recovery of a company which might then have to be liquidated and terminate its 
employees. 23 1 A wage earner protection fund with a waiver of preferential status 
for subrogated claims would be a big step forward to prevent this adverse affect 
on employees and would take the interests of unsecured creditors into account. 
227 Keeper, above n I 03 , 241. 
228 See above Chapter IV D. 
229 Australian Law Reform Commission, above n 9, paras 723 and 724. 
23° Cork, above n 24, para 1397. 
23 1 See above Chapter IV D. 
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5 Compulsory insurance scheme 
Before the introduction of the GEERS, the Australian Minister of 
Employment, Workplace Relations and Small Business also considered another 
option, namely a compulsory insurance scheme.232 A compulsory insurance 
scheme would involve the introduction of a national program covering all private-
sector employees. Businesses with more than 20 employees would be required to 
take out compulsory insurance to protect their employees' entitlements. The 
government would fund direct payments to protect the entitlements of employees 
of small businesses, those with fewer than 20 employees. This option would 
include less government involvement. The costs would be shared by employers 
and employees with the government bearing only the risk of small businesses' 
insolvencies. 
However, this option would lead to even higher administration costs, as 
both private insurances and government would be involved in the administrative 
process. Of even more importance is that a private insurance system would be too 
uncertain and unpredictable. With an insurance system the costs would vary 
according to the risk of companies becoming insolvent and failing to pay their 
employee entitlements. Insurance contributions might vary depending on the 
insolvency risk and the size of the workforce in certain industries. 233 Private 
insurers might be cautious and so the initial premium costs would be likely to be 
high. Additionally, there is the almost unmanageable risk of non-compliance. This 
risk does not occur with the same probability under a wage earner protection fund , 
because the government is the administrative body and will use an already 
existing collecting system. For all these reasons a wage earner protection fund 
administrated by government is to be preferred. 
6 Abolition of preferential creditor system in Germany 
Both Germany and Austria have completely abolished their preferential 
creditor regime. These countries introduced wage earner protection programs 
including payments for unpaid wages, holiday pay and redundancy payments.234 
The funds are based on the European Community Insolvency Protection Directive 
232 See Minister of Employment, Workplace Relations and Small Business. above n 209. 
233 See Symes, above n l 87. 
234 For Germany, see para 183 SGB III. 
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80/987/EEC and are similar to that of the United Kingdom. In contrast to the 
United Kingdom, both countries abolished the preferential status for subrogated 
claims under the wage earner protection programs. 235 In the following, the reasons 
for and the effects of the abolition in Germany will be considered. Parliament 
abolished the preferential creditor system on several reasons; priority infringes the 
pari passu rule and prejudices unsecured creditors; employees would be placed in 
a better position than before the event of insolvency; every priority system 
chooses people at random. 236 
The rationale underlying the pari passu rule is that no creditors should 
receive preference over the general body of creditors in the division of assets. 
Exceptions to the rule require justification. The government had difficulties in 
identifying any social or economic policy grounds for giving subrogated claims of 
the fund priority over the claims of trading and other unsecured creditors.237 The 
objective was to ensure employees were paid without impacting adversely on 
other creditors. Parliament emphasised that payments to unsecured creditors were 
usually only a small proportion of the entitlement. The abolition of preferential 
creditors will therefore lead to a direct enlargement of assets for unsecured 
creditors which could conquer the financial crisis at least in some cases. 
Additionally, the improvement of anyone' s financial situation because of 
the intervention of insolvency is unjust. 238 Prior to the winding up the "first come 
first served" principle applies. All creditors have the same right to enforce their 
interests. Preferential creditors do not exist. In the event of insolvency all creditors 
should therefore be treated equally. The "first come first served principle" should 
give way to that of the orderly realisation of assets for the benefit of all secured 
credit ors. 239 
Finally, the Federal Constitutional Court questioned any priority order as 
being random. 240 The prior existing preferential creditor system did not give 
priority to all social groups which are worthy of protection. For example, there is 
235 German Parliament Printed Paper OJ 2/2443 ( 1998), see previous para 61 KO. 
236 Ibid, p 90 . 
237 Ibid . 
238 Ibid . 
239 Ibid . 
240 Gemrnn Federal lJ1Sti tutional Court B Ve ,fGE 65, I 82 ( 1983 ). 
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no priority for claims for the maintenance of another person. Other involuntary 
creditors, such as those by tort victims or by government agencies for the cost of 
repairing damage to the environment caused by a negligent debtor are not 
protected. 
Before the coming into force of the new Insolvency Act, 70 percent of all 
petitions in insolvency were rejected because the assets were insufficient. 241 The 
average recovery rate of unsecured creditors stood at three percent. The beginning 
of liquidation proceedings with distribution of the assets has now increased up to 
60 percent.242 That does not mean that unsecured creditors get paid to the amount 
of their full entitlement. However, in 60 percent of all insolvency cases unsecured 
creditors get some form of payment. Among other reasons, the new recovery 
possibilities can be put down to the abolition of preferential entitlements. The 
chances for business recovery have significantly improved. Insolvency 
practitioners are comfortable with the new law and confirm that the abolition of 
preferential creditors has proved to be valuable. 243 
7 Balancing of interests 
Weighing up the advantages and disadvantages involves a complex 
balancing of interests. The protection of employees against the risk of their 
employer's insolvency is a matter of public interest and social order. 
As evidenced by the recent changes in the employees' entitlement, the 
level of protection afforded to employees has been considered in need of 
improvement. The legislator tried to address this need by doubling the cap for the 
preferential entitlements of employees and by including redundancy payments. 
However, the preferential creditor system is a rules-based mechanism to allocate 
risk among creditors and to create priorities in insolvency law. Especially 
redundancy payments have proved to be not compatible with the system. 
24 1 Oliver Liersch, " International Insolvency law - Sicherungsrechte im Intemationalen 
lnsolvenzrecht" Skript IJ1Solvenzrecht (2001) http: www.amb-online.de/downloads amb l.pdf 
(accessed 30 September 2008) 6. 
242 Committee on Legal Affairs Expert Hearing (2006) 7 lndat-Report, 9. 
243 Ibid. 
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Additionally, preferential status does not provide adequate protection, where the 
assets are insufficient to meet all preferential claims. Furthermore, the preferential 
creditor system does not cover all social groups which are worthy of protection. 244 
The aim of protecting employees is therefore better accomplished through 
social welfare legislation. A wage guarantee scheme offers employees the greatest 
certainty in terms of immediate payment. Redundancy payments would fit this 
system much better. A wage earner protection fund can account for social policies 
and the need to protect specific groups. The inclusion of redundancy payments 
would not have economic flow-on effects for other unsecured creditors. 
Additionally, it would have to be decided which employees should benefit from 
the fund. Australia has excluded director-employees from preferential payments, 
but included them within the GEERS. This shows that a protection fund can grant 
protection to a greater extent than the preferential creditor system as it does not 
affect the efficiency of insolvency law. 
There is no doubt, that there will be additional and significant costs. 
However, the costs and risks would be widespread among all employers and 
employees or taxpayers and not only to the detriment of unsecured creditors. 
These additional costs are the consequence of providing necessary protection for 
employees. 
The introduction of a wage earner protection fund without eliminating the 
preferential status of employees would bolster the position of employees, but the 
difficulties in applying the preferential creditor rules would remain as the 
employee's claim would be subrogated. Only the abolition of preferential status 
for employee's entitlements would enlarge the assets for unsecured creditors. 
With regard to the efficiency of insolvency law245 a waiver of preferential status 
for subrogated claims of the fund is preferable. 
It is difficult to foresee the New Zealand's legislator withdrawing 
preferential status for employees. Historically, employees have been in a preferred 
position on insolvency since 1867.246 However, regarding the deficiencies the 
244 See above Chapter V C 6. 
245 See above Chapter IV D. 
246 Heath, above n 4, 45 . 
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actual preferential creditor system causes and the need to give employees further 
protection employees is the abolition the best alternative: Employees would be 
better protected and insolvency law would be made more efficient. 
D Abolition of Crown Preferential Status 
In recent years the trend in other jurisdictions has been towards restricting 
or abolishing Crown preferences. In contrast to New Zealand, Australia,247 
Canada,248 and the United Kingdom completely abolished the preferential status 
of Crown debts. 249 Crown preferential debts can hardly be justified on social or 
economic reasons. In particular, the arguments that the Crown revenue needs to be 
protected and that the CIR is an involuntary creditor are not convincing. 
Particularly with regard to GST the quasi-trust nature argument does not apply. 250 
New Zealand should therefore abolish Crown preferential entitlements. 
The abolition of Crown preferences would leave millions of dollars for the 
equal distribution of the assets. Revenue-related preferential debts make up 
approximately 60 per cent of the total debt owed by companies in liquidation. 251 
The benefits of the abolition would automatically flow to general secured and 
unsecured creditors, though the Crown would be able to share in this amount as a 
newly unsecured creditor. The huge amount of tax debt and especially GST tax 
shows the great impact the abolition of preferential status would have on the 
entitlements of general secured and unsecured creditors. Additionally, the 
abolition of crown preferences would quantitatively reduce difficulties in applying 
the preferential creditor priority rules. It would therefore make the insolvency 
system more efficient. 
Furthermore, by introducing a wage earner protection fund the government 
could protect its interests with regard to employee deduction debts. Under the 
wage earner protection funds of Australia, the United Kingdom and Canada 
payments are reduced by applicable income taxes. The fund administrators deduct 
247 S 556 of the Corporations Act 2001. 
248 S 86 Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act ( 1985). 
249 S 25lofthe Enterprise Act 2002. 
250 See above Chapter IV C 2 (d). 
25 1 Munt, above n 167, 6. 
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the amount which the employer would have had to deduct if he had paid the 
employee. 252 
As a flipside of the abolishment of Crown preferential status, directors 
have been made personal liable for un-remitted company taxes in Australia. 253 
However, there is no natural link between the abolition of preferential Crown debt 
and the imposition of directors' liability. 254 For example, in the United Kingdom 
Crown priority was removed without imposing personal liability on directors. 
Director's liability has to be seen in the context of the already existing liabilities 
upon directors for unpaid taxes. 255 
E Miscellaneous 
The research paper did not focus on the highest class of priority debts, 
namely the administration costs. 256 However, it explained the specific status that 
these costs are not typical preferential debts as they occur only because of the 
event of insolvency. 257 The preferential creditor system would still have to 
provide for these costs. To simplify the preferential creditor system, these claims 
could get a super priority status and rank even before all secured creditors. As the 
secured creditors also have an interest in "well paid and good" administrators, 
their first rank over all other creditors could be justified. The Law Commission 
also emphasised the special position of administration costs by recommending 
that these costs should rank before all other priorities, while all other priorities 
should have the same rank. 258 
Difficulties regarding claims under Schedule 7 clause 1 (3) and ( 4) of the 
Act can be neglected as the value of these claims is usually small. The amounts at 
issue in relation to preferential claims based on layby sales or on compromise 
costs will generally be modest and are unlikely to impact unduly on dividends 
252 See above Chapter V C 2. 
253 Income Tax Assessment Act 1936, ss 222 AOB, AGB, and AHA. 
254 Brown and Telfer, above n 40, 89. 
255 Income Tax Act 2004, s HK 11 (3) and (5), Brown and Telfer, above n 40, 89. 
256 Schedule 7 clause I (I) of the Act, section 30(2)(a) of the Receiverships Act. 
257 See above Chapter II B. 
258 Law Commission, above n 26, para 219. 
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received by other creditors.259 On the other hand it could be reconsidered whether 
there is still a need to protect these claims. 
259 Ibid , para 4 7. 
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VI CONCLUSION 
The distribution of an insolvent's assets among its creditors is an 
intractable issue of insolvency law. The preferential creditor priority rules involve 
a technical and complicated structure. There are still some deficiencies, in 
particular that the system is partly inconsistent with the PPSA. Improvements 
would especially be the introduction of a unified preferential creditor regime. 
With regard to the efficiency of insolvency law, New Zealand might be 
better off if it changed some traditional attitudes. There is a need to change 
preferential entitlements and pay greater attention to the claims of unsecured 
creditors. Concerning the abolition of Crown preferential debts, there are barely 
any convincing arguments against it. Therefore, New Zealand should abolish 
Crown preferential status as Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia and most 
European countries did . 
Regarding employees ' preferential entitlements, employees are often the 
most exposed creditors and the least able to absorb a wage loss. In practice, the 
issue involves difficult policy choices. Affording greater protection to unpaid 
wages comes at the cost to either unsecured creditors or to employees, employers 
or the taxpayers. Paying greater attention to the claims of unsecured creditors as 
well as to employees can be reached by the creation of a wage earner protection 
fund. Other countries of the commonwealth as well as European countries have 
already done it. New Zealand should follow suit. The preferable way would be a 
fund without preferential status for subrogated claims. 
The abolition of preferential status for the two most significant classes, 
namely Crown and employees would lead to a quasi abolition of the preferential 
creditor system, though at least the costs of administering the insolvency would 
still need to be provided for. The insolvency law of Germany has shown that this 
path pays off The abolition may sound like an insane proposal as it would be a 
milestone in New Zealand's insolvency law. However, regarding recent 
developments in the other countries of the commonwealth, plenty of changes have 
taken place. The question which should always be kept in mind is whether the 
granting of preferential status is consistent with efficient insolvency 
administration. 
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